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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
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The Czech Republic is one of the ten Central and East European countries 
(CEECs) which has applied for EU membership.1 In July 1997 the EC 
Commission presented its Opinions on the applications for membership; and in 
its communication, Agenda 2000,2 it recommended that membership 
negotiations begin with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia.3
At the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg it was decided 
to open negotiations with these five countries and with Cyprus. This decision 
could, however, be modified prior to the first wave of enlargement if additional 
CEECs are considered ready for membership, or if some of the present front­
runners appear to be backsliding. In particular, the order of the accession queue 
may be adjusted in the light of the regular reviews of the applicant countries 
carried out by the Commission.4 The fact that any enlargement must be ratified 
by all EU member states suggests that there may be strong practical reasons to 
proceed with enlargement in groups rather than country by country.
The 1994 European Council at Essen decided in favour of a pre­
accession strategy to help the CEECs prepare to join the EU. In Agenda 2000, 
the Commission proposed that this pre-accession strategy be reinforced by the 
adoption of "Accession Partnerships". These would entail additional assistance 
from the PHARE Programme,5 as well as transfers to all ten CEEC applicants
*1 would like to thank the Robert Schuman Centre and the Austrian Government for financing 
this research in the context of their project on The Eastward Enlargement of the European 
Union: The case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I would also like to thank Jan Zielonka 
for his encouragement, Milan Sojka for providing data and advice, and three anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer about responsibility of course 
applies.
' Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia.
-  EC Commission (1997a). For the sake of convenience this document shall be referred to in 
the text and notes as Agenda 2000.
 ̂ Malta has suspended its application.
4 The condition that these are carried out on request of the applicant country implies that 
these reviews are not automatically annual.
5 The PHARE (Poland/Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction) Programme entails aid for 
economic and political transition and has been in operation since 1989. The name is 
somewhat misleading, since the Programme has been extended to all the CEEC applicant 
countries. Under the Accession Partnerships, assistance through the PHARE Programme 
would be more focused with, for instance, greater emphasis on the need to improve 



























































































through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural Funds prior to 
accession.6
The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 laid down certain conditions 
for enlargement:
• the applicant state must have a functioning market economy with the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Community;
• the applicant state must have achieved stability o f institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule o f law, human rights and respect for and protection o f 
minorities;
• the applicant state must be able to take on the obligations o f membership, 
including adherence to the aims o f economic and monetary, and political 
union.
The Copenhagen European Council also stipulated that enlargement is subject 
to the condition that the EU is able to absorb new members while maintaining 
the momentum of integration.7
The requirement that the applicant countries be able to fulfil "obligations 
of membership'1 is generally taken to mean their ability to adopt the acquis 
communautaire,8 Agenda 2000 (p. 45) presents a framework for this task which 
includes implementing the provisions of the Europe Agreements,9 adopting the 
programme for regulatory alignment with the Single European Market as set out 
by the Commission's 1995 White Paper,10 and taking on other aspects of the
6 For a more detailed account see Agenda 2000, in particular its Table 4, p. 76.
2 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/93. p. 13.
8 The acquis communautaire is the body of EU legislation, practices, principles, and 
objectives accepted by the member states. It is composed of the Treaties (and, most 
importantly, the Treaties of Rome, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and, 
following ratification, the Amsterdam Treaty); legislation enacted at the EU level and 
judgements of the European Court of Justice; Justice and Home Affairs; Foreign and Security 
Policy and Treaties of the EU with third countries. The acquis has been accumulating over the 
years and now amounts to some 12,000 legislative acts.
9 All ten CEECs which have applied for EU membership have signed Association (Europe) 
Agreements with the EU. The Agreements include provisions for trade liberalisation (see 
Section IVb below), political dialogue and legal approximation (which is discussed in Section 
Va).
EC Commission (1995) Preparation of the Associated Countries o f Central and Eastern 




























































































acquis in areas such as agriculture and the environment. The applicant countries 
are also required to ensure effective implementation of the acquis, which entails 
substantial changes in their administrative and judicial capacities.
When accession negotiations began in March 1998 the Commission 
began to "screen" the applicant countries to assess their progress in taking on 
the acquis, and quickly learned that the scale of the task had been seriously 
underestimated. Both Agenda 2000 and the Commission's proposals of March 
1998 for the 2000-2006 financial perspective were based on the working 
assumption of five CEECs entering the EU in 2002. At present, there is a 
widespread (if unofficial) conviction on both sides that the first wave of 
Eastward enlargement will take place later.
One of the consequences of the screening process is that at least with 
regard to the first-wave countries, there has been a shift in emphasis towards 
fulfilling the "obligations of membership" and away from the other Copenhagen 
accession criteria. The speed and progress of accession negotiations now 
appears to depend primarily on the ability of a country to adopt and implement 
the acquis.
The question which then arises concerns the utility of the Copenhagen 
criteria. To clarify discussion of this question, we shall take a single CEEC as a 
case study. The Czech Republic has been chosen, not only because it is one of 
the front runners in the transition process (see also Tables 1 and 2 in the 
Appendix), but also because of its unique (and ultimately unsuccessful) 
experience among the CEECs in trying to maintain a fixed exchange rate over a 
long period.
To date relatively little research has been carried out on the problem of 
trying to reconcile the two main items on the EU agenda: EMU (Economic and 
Monetary Union) and enlargement. One of the aims here is to indicate the 
specific difficulties posed by EMU for the transition economies.
The present analysis is limited to the economic criteria for accession set 
by the Copenhagen European Council" and progress in taking on the acquis. 
Section II considers criticisms of the way in which the criteria are being 
applied, while Section III deals with the question of whether the applicant 
country has a functioning market economy. Section IV will discuss the ability 
of the applicant to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
EU. Section V considers the task of taking on the obligations of membership, 
with Section Va dealing with the acquis, and Section Vb discussing the 1




























































































objective of EMU. Section VI deals with the question of whether the EU can 
absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of integration, focusing 
on enlargement’s implications for the EU’s most costly policies, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds.12
II. The accession criteria
The accession criteria are presumably intended to provide some kind of 
objective basis for selecting those CEECs ready to join the EU, while indicating 
to the applicant countries the tasks they are expected to perform. However, the 
simple deduction that "when a CEEC meets the accession criteria it can join the 
EU" is misleading, for the EU reserves considerable discretion in deciding 
whether the accession criteria have been met.1 ’ This discretion arises from:
• the number of criteria;
• the wide-ranging and vague nature of certain criteria;
• the failure to indicate the relative importance of the criteria, and
• the expectation that a given CEEC demonstrate not only its ability to meet 
the accession criteria at a particular moment, but rather its ability to do so on 
a sustainable basis.
Although Agenda 2000 and the Opinions on the applicant countries do provide 
an indication of how the Commission is interpreting the criteria, much 
ambiguity remains. This ambiguity means that countries excluded from 
accession negotiations or relegated to a lower place in the accession queue may 
argue that the lack of objectivity of the criteria permits political manoeuvring 
by the EU. In the absence of unambiguous criteria, when the EU relegates a 
country to signal the need for improved performance, it may provoke a backlash 
against European integration.14
Various instances of the ambiguous nature of individual criteria can be 
cited. For instance, it is not immediately obvious how to interpret the phrase 
that the CEECs should have a "functioning market economy" in order to cope 
with competitive pressures. If a "functioning market economy" is taken to refer 
to a textbook case in which adjustment is swift and painless, it is clear that it
*2 Although not considered here in detail, the issue of reform of EU institutions is crucial in 
this context. For discussions of this issue see CEPR (1992), Baldwin (1994), and Senior Nello 
and Smith (1997).
It is interesting to draw a parallel with the other main programme of the EU (EMU), where 
criteria were also set and were subsequently interpreted in a discretionary way, even though 
there was far less scope for discretion than with the Copenhagen criteria.




























































































will ensure capacity to cope with competitive pressures. However, in this case 
the extent of transformation required of the CEECs would be excessive, taking 
them far beyond the situation in present member states whose "functioning 
market economies" are subject to rigidities in both product and factor markets. 
The question therefore becomes one of the degree of adjustment which is 
necessary to ensure the "functioning" of a "market" economy.
Assessment on the basis of capacity to cope with competitive pressures 
within the EU is also extremely complex, requiring not just a comprehensive 
evaluation of present economic performance, but also predictions concerning 
future developments. An enormous amount of analysis is required in order to 
decide which sectors and which CEEC firms are likely to survive in an enlarged 
EU. In the absence of a complete picture of the situation, the assessment how 
well a CEEC will respond to competitive pressures involves a large element of 
guesswork.
Enlargement is also subject to the condition that the EU must be able to 
absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of integration. The EC 
has already experienced "Eurosclerosis" of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the 
energies of the Community were dissipated in arguments over the level of 
agricultural price support and the relative contributions of member states to the 
EC Budget. Because enlargement will require fundamental changes in the CAP, 
the EU Budget and the Structural Funds (though such changes would probably 
be necessary anyway), there is a real risk that the EU will return to a situation of 
internal dissension.
The onus is therefore on the EU to ensure that operable policies and 
institutions are in place before enlargement takes place, but the applicant 
countries must for their part adopt appropriate policies during the pre-accession 
period. As will be shown in Section VI, the difficulty lies in identifying which 
policies are "appropriate".
A further problem is the division of the tasks requested of the applicant 
countries into pre-accession or post-accession requirements. In some areas, 
such as social and environmental measures, the adjustment required of the 
CEECs prior to accession would seem excessive. 15
This issue is taken up briefly in Section V below. See Orlowski and Mayhew (1997) and 




























































































III. Developing a functioning market economy
To assess the extent to which the CEECs have developed functioning market 
economies, Agenda 2000 lists a number of conditions:16 *
• equilibrium between demand and supply is established between the free 
interplay of market forces; and prices and trade are liberalised:
• there are no significant barriers to market entry or exit;
• the legal system is in place;
• there is broad consensus about the aims of economic policy, and
• the financial sector is sufficiently well developed.
According to the Commission's Opinion, a functioning market economy is 
"largely in place" in the Czech Republic and, in particular:
" ...the privatisation process is almost complete....The legal and institutional features 
of a market system have largely been adopted: property rights are being 
defined....there are no significant administrative controls blocking entry to the 
market; and the banking sector has been reformed to some extent". 11
The Commission document does qualify this assessment, saying:18
"... it is not clear that all market institutions are as yet sufficiently strong or 
completely operational. Two main examples are the financial and capital markets".
The Commission rightly points out that it is precisely in the requirement that 
market institutions should be operational that some of the major shortcomings 
in Czech performance arise. Although appropriate legislation is being passed 
relatively quickly, it is important to ensure that the legislation is enforced and 
operates effectively.
In two particular areas the implementation of legislation supported by 
appropriate institutions would appear incomplete in the Czech Republic:
• Privatisation (and the definition o f property rights). Privatisation was not 
(or should not have been) considered an end in itself, but rather as a means 
to furthering other objectives, including that of increasing the efficiency of 
firms.
• Transformation o f the financial sector. The Commission's Opinion points to 
this as a weak aspect of the Czech transition. However, it is useful to discuss
1® Agenda 2000, p. 42.
O  EC Commission (1997b, p. 29).




























































































explicitly the consequences of the slow transformation of financial and 
capital markets, because the Czech experience illustrates its possible 
implications for the overall process of economic and political transition.
A. Privatisation and the problem of corporate governance
The operation of the Czech economy is profoundly affected by a system of 
complex and confused ownership relations arising from the incomplete nature 
of the privatisation process, as well as by the predominant role played by the 
banks in the Czech economy.
In the Czech Republic privatisation relied on a variety of techniques 
including property restitution, direct sales, auctions and public tenders, as well 
as the mass privatisation scheme through the voucher system. The voucher 
scheme was a "self-consciously Czech undertaking" (Vachudova, 1998, p. 15) 
designed by Klaus's economic team, and was even discouraged by certain 
Western actors such as the IMF and World Bank.
The mass privatisation scheme appeared to offer advantages in terms of 
speed,19 distributional fairness, and popular support. Although it meant 
foregoing government revenue, the voucher scheme seemed a way of 
overcoming the shortages of domestic liquid assets and of bypassing some of 
the difficulties in valuing state enterprises.
The privatisation of most large-scale state enterprises took place in two 
waves.20 The first was launched in the former Czechoslovakia in 1992 and was 
complete by mid-1993. In the Czech Republic it involved sales of shares as well 
as the transfer of shares in some 988 firms through a voucher scheme.21 The 
second wave began in the Czech Republic in 1994 and aimed at privatising a 
further 2000 firms through a mixture of sales and a voucher scheme.22
For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Estrin, Nuti, and Uvalic (1998). As these 
authors illustrate, in general the implementation of mass privatisation schemes was much 
slower than expected.
20 For a description of these developments and a recent survey of privatisation in the CEECs 
see Uvalic and Vaughan-Whitehead (1997).
21 Unless otherwise stated, the statistics on privatisation are taken from European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1997a, 1997b and 1997c).
22 As Estrin, Nuti, and Uvalic (1998) describe, the government prepared and published a list 
of enterprises to be privatised. Apart from the 3% equity which had to go to a restitution fund, 
in principle an enterprise could propose that the remaining 97% of its equity be privatised 
through the voucher scheme. According to Coffee (1996, p. 120) Czech enterprises used 
voucher privatisation to distribute 64% of their total stock value in the first wave of mass 




























































































From being one of the most state-dominated economies of the Eastern 
bloc (together with the former GDR), by mid-1997 the private sector accounted 
for some 75% of Czech GDP. Although the amount of property privatised 
through the voucher scheme was lower than expected, it still amounted to some 
25% of total state assets privatised (Takla, 1994, p. 161).
Initial fears that voucher privatisation would lead to excessive dispersion 
of ownership were not borne out, largely due to the role of the Investment 
Privatisation Funds (IPFs).23 It is estimated that some 72% of privatisation 
vouchers were placed with the IPFs and used to buy shares in the first wave of 
mass privatisation, and 63% in the second wave (Estrin, Nuti and Uvalic 1998). 
Most of the investment funds were held by state-dominated banks and 
insurance companies. After the first wave of voucher privatisation, the IPFs 
become shareholders of a large number of enterprises, including financial 
companies and each other.24 Cross-ownership was widespread, and this together 
with legal loopholes tended to encourage insider trading and fraud.25
The term "tunnelling" was coined to describe the financial operations by 
which the assets of IPFs, banks and enterprises were channelled to other firms 
owned by the same people. In this way, the managers were frequently able to 
enrich themselves at the expense of the legal owners, such as the shareholders 
of an IPF (Vachudova, 1998, p. 16).
A related shortcoming of the Czech method of privatisation concerns 
corporate governance of firms. In small firms, the owner is usually also the 
manager, and so corporate governance is relatively straightforward. The 
difficulty arises with larger firms, where the divorce between ownership and 
control necessitates monitoring to ensure that managers act in the best interest 
of the firm. The ability of owners to remove managers may also be required to 
ensure the efficient operation and restructuring of the firm.
There are two main models of corporate governance. The Anglo- 
American model relies on efficient financial markets with shareholder bids and 
the prospect of take-overs as a means of disciplining managers.26 The German-
23 These could take the form of either joint stock companies or mutual funds.
24 The cross-ownership is partly the result of the restriction on the IPFs ownership to not 
more than 20% of the shares of a company, and the requirement that the holding in any one 
company cannot exceed 10% of the IPF's portfolio.
25 According to The Economist (19 April 1997), some 750,000 people or 7% of the 
population suffered losses as a result of the activities of the EPFs.
26 If managers are thought to be incompetent or inefficient this may be reflected in lower 




























































































Japanese model relies more on the relations between firms and their owners 
(often banks, which may hold a significant amount of shares) to monitor the 
behaviour of managers and the performance of the firm .27
The pattern which has emerged in the Czech Republic fails to correspond 
to either of these models. Lack of transparency has meant that trading on the 
Czech stock exchange has been thin, so discipline operating through 
transactions on financial markets has yet to emerge.28 Complex ownership 
relations and weak regulation create few checks on the activities of the IPFs. 
The managers of investment funds are often less concerned with the profit 
maximisation and restructuring of the firm in which they own shares, than with 
siphoning off capital and appropriating profits. 29
The lesson to be learnt from the Czech experience is not that voucher 
privatisation per se leads to problems of corporate governance. Countries such 
as Poland, Hungary or Croatia which have relied more heavily on direct sales 
have not achieved better results. Across the region, the shortage of domestic 
capital meant that sales took place at preferential conditions, often to employees 
or managers (often members of the nomenklatura). These new owners were 
frequently less concerned with the maximisation of profits than with the 
survival of their own firm and the entrenchment of their own position, if 
necessary by lobbying politicians and bureaucrats.
The lesson is rather that until the financial system is adequately 
developed and an effective regulatory system is in place, difficulties in limiting
Competitive product markets also limit the scope for X-inefficiency of the firm and hence the 
extent of damage that unconstrained managers may wreak (Estnn, 1997, p. 5).
In 1990 some 80% of firms in Germany had one shareholder with at least 25% of equity 
(Estrin, Nuti and Uvalic, 1998). The system of keiretsu involves an important role for 
financial institutions and cross-ownership in the monitoring and control o f companies in 
Japan (Rothacher, A. 1993). The keiretsu (which means series, or group) may be vertical or 
horizontal. The horizontal keiretsu cover all the main activities required by the manufacturing 
process (finance, insurance, transport, warehouses, distribution, etc.) and all these services are 
provided exclusively bv members of the group. Vertical keiretsu control key sectors of the 
Japanese economy such as automobile production and electronics. It is partly due to this 
system that the current banking crisis has such far-reaching consequences in the Japanese 
economy.
28 In 1997 measures to improve the regulation of capital markets were announced, including 
daily reports issued by the Securities Centre to improve the transparency of trading on 
domestic equity markets.
29 Owners can be assumed to have an interest in increasing the net worth of the firm, which 
implies the maximisation of profits. Managers are likely to be more concerned with their own 
goals such as job security, pay, fringe benefits, power and so on. A problem of asymmetry of 
information arises as the legal shareholders may not know enough to assess whether the 




























































































managerial discretion and ensuring effective corporate governance are likely to 
persist. Statements to the effect that economic transformation is complete (such 
as that of Vaclav Klaus at the end of 1995) would therefore seem premature.
B. The consequences of slow transformation of financial and capital 
markets
Reform of the financial system in a transition economy entails the creation of a 
two-tier banking system, with the establishment of an independent central bank, 
a commercial banking system, and financial markets for bonds and shares. In 
1990 legislation was introduced to end the monobank system in the former 
Czechoslovakia, and in 1993 the Czech National Bank was established as a 
replacement for the former state bank of Czechoslovakia.
The Czech banking sector has grown rapidly, and in 1996 included 55 
licensed commercial banks.30 However, between 1994 and 1996 11 Czech 
banks failed. There have also been numerous financial scandals and instances 
of negligence and fraud, which were among the causes of the resignation of 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and the fall of his centre-right coalition 
government in late 1997. The two underlying sources of the fragility of the 
financial system are the failure to introduce much-needed regulation of the 
emerging financial market; and the unclear pattern of ownership in the partially 
privatised system, which led to perverse incentives and conflicting objectives.
Commercial banks in the Czech Republic consist of banks created 
through the separation of commercial activities of the former central bank, and 
of smaller, new banks frequently set up by enterprises at least in part to meet 
their own financial requirements.
A problem for the small, new commercial banks was that their 
management was sometimes "more interested in the financial problems of the 
enterprise which owns the bank than in preserving the bank's viability and 
increasing its profits" (OECD, 1996, p. 51). The slow development of sound 
accounting practices and the absence of an effective supervisory system meant 
that the precarious situation of some of these banks was often not immediately 
understood.
For several years the banks emerging from the former mono-bank system 
were only partially privatised, and the state continued to play an important role 
in the largest of these banks through the National Property Fund (NPF), or state




























































































agency responsible for privatising state assets.31 Serious moves to fully privatise 
the main Czech banks had to wait until 1998.32
A major problem faced by the banks emerging from the mono-bank 
system was the legacy of "bad debts" of state enterprises that these banks 
inherited. Moreover, during the early years of transition all banks tended to take 
on dubious assets in order to increase their market share.33 Enterprises were 
indebted to banks, and the banks were often called upon to decide who should 
receive state financing. As a result, in some cases the banks acted as owners, 
creditors and auditors of the newly "privatised" enterprises (Vachudova, 1998,
p. 6).
There have been various interventions by the Czech authorities to meet 
the problem of bad debts, including a law in 1995 allowing banks to obtain tax 
relief on provisions against bad loans.34 Apart from their high budgetary cost, 
these interventions encountered the problem of moral hazard in that the 
reluctance of banks to take on bad assets may be lessened by the prospect of 
being bailed out.35
Widespread diffusion of bad debts may also render the instruments of 
monetary policy less effective.36 Even when monetary policy is tightened, the 
banks may continue to support state enterprises which are backed by
31 The NPF maintained a minority ownership of 47% in Komercnl banka, 43% of Ceska 
Sporitelna and 33% in the Investicm a Postovnl banka (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1997a, p. 147).
32 A 36% share in Investicm' a Postovm Banka was sold to the Japanese Investment Bank, 
Nomura, and Agrobanka was sold to GE Capital. A tender was due to be issued for the sale to 
one investor of 51 per cent of the state's 66 per cent share in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka 
(CSOB). Proposals for the privatisation of the other two largest banks, Komercnl Banka and 
Ceska Sporitelna were still being discussed (Financial Times, 14 May 1998). The process of 
privatisation was slowed down by the debate about whether the state should first recapitalise 
the banks and take over their bad debts, and by the dispute concerning the share of Slovak 
holdings in the Komercnl and Ceskoslovenska Obchodni banks.
33 OECD (1996, p. 52).
34 Earlier measures include the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Finance directly taking over 
loans amounting to 13.3 billion kcs from the Investicm' a Postovm banka in 1992. In 1994 the 
Czech government allocated 7 billion kcs for Agrobanka, Komercnl banka and KOB to write 
off bad loans of state enterprises to be restituted to former owners.
35 To meet these difficulties, Rodlauer (1995, p. 104) argues that an effective strategy to 
tackle the problem of bad debts should: strengthen enterprise discipline and discourage firms 
from taking on further bad loans: create a new banking philosophy whereby banks choose and 
monitor clients carefully; and evolve an overall framework for dealing with bad debts which 
includes bank recapitalisation through the state budget.




























































































government guarantees. Substantial increases in the price of credit may 
therefore fail to limit credit expansion and may mean that small private firms 
are crowded out as an increasing share of credit goes to the large state 
enterprises.
The existence of bad debts may also have contributed to the high interest 
rate spread between credits and deposits in the Czech Republic, thereby adding 
to the cost of borrowing to set up new firms or restructure existing ones, and 
slowing down the transition process.
In 1996, the Czech National Bank announced measures to consolidate the 
banking system and improve the balance sheets of smaller banks. Banks were 
required to increase their share capital to cover problem loans. In 1998. a 
Securities and Exchange Commission was established in order to bring greater 
transparency to the stock exchange and reduce the opportunities for insider 
trading. Legislation was also passed to force investment funds to sell off 
portions of their holdings, and banks were ordered to separate their asset 
management businesses from their lending operations and to reduce the 
maximum share they can hold in industrial enterprises to 50%.37 However, it 
was generally agreed that rebuilding confidence in the Czech capital market 
would be a lengthy process as it required changes not only in legislation, but 
also in institutions and commercial attitudes.
A question linked both to the issue of corporate governance and to the 
role of the banks is the significance of barriers to market entry or exit. Anti­
trust measures can play an important role in this context. The Europe 
Agreements committed the CEECs to adopting competition policies compatible 
with those of the EU, an objective which was further specified in the 1995 
White Paper.38
Here as elsewhere, EU pressure to force measures which are unpopular, 
but essential to the transformation process, may provide reforming governments 
with a useful excuse. The need to bring legislation in line with that in EU 
countries in areas such as the control of state aids can provide CEEC 
governments with a strong justification for resisting rent-seeking by producers.
37 Financial Times, 14 May 1998.
38 The White Paper refers to Articles 85, 86 and 90 relating to competition rules, and Article 
92 concerning state aids. Although taking on a ready-made legal system avoids a long process 
of trial and error may have advantages, it also runs the risk that the imported system will not 




























































































IV. Coping with competitive pressures within the EU
It is anticipated that with removal of trade barriers upon accession to the EU, 
many firms in the CEECs whose output was formerly destined for the domestic 
or eastern markets will be unable to survive. This problem is addressed by the 
Copenhagen criterion on competitive pressures.
In assessing whether an applicant country meets this criterion, what is 
required is no less than a comprehensive, sector-by-sector analysis of the 
present economic performance of that country and its likely future performance 
in an enlarged market. This is a mammoth task requiring analysis on the scale 
of the Cecchini Report. Although discussion of capacity to cope with 
competitive pressures occupies a large part of the Commission's Opinions on 
the applications of the CEEC countries, the analysis is inevitably piecemeal and 
incomplete.39
Given the unavailability of satisfactory analyses, the question arises as to 
whether the ability to assess a CEEC on the basis of this criterion truly matters. 
The risk is that if too many CEEC firms are unable to compete in an enlarged 
EU market, widescale bankruptcies and unemployment could result. This would 
lead to widening income disparities and could add to migratory pressures in an 
enlarged EU. The proposed ceiling on transfers under the Structural Funds 
(according to which transfers cannot exceed 4% of the recipient country's GDP) 
means that financial assistance from the EU would be relatively limited. 
Moreover the stabilisation programmes of these countries and their ultimate aim 
of taking on the objective of EMU means that tight financial discipline is likely 
to continue. There therefore seems a strong case for further research on the 
issue of competitiveness in order to identify appropriate indicators of progress 
in preparing for accession.
A. Indicators of ability to cope with competitive pressures
Agenda 2000 (p. 43) lists a number of factors which should be taken into 
account in assessing the ability of CEEC firms to compete in a wider EU 
market:
• the existence of a functioning market economy with a sufficient degree of 
overall macroeconomic stability;
• sufficient human and physical capital, including infrastructure;
39 a  further difficulty arises from the standardised and rather bureaucratic language used to 
assess the applicant countries in the Opinions. For example, individual CEECs are described 
as achieving "substantial success" or needing "further progress" or "substantial efforts", 




























































































• the extent to which government policies influence competitiveness through 
trade policy, competition policy, state aids etc.;
• the degree of trade integration achieved before enlargement, and
• the share of small and medium enterprises in the economy.
A number of items which the EU should take into account, could be added to 
this list.
• the degree of restructuring and modernisation of declining industrial sectors 
such as coal, steel and agriculture;
• success in developing industries characterised by growing demand and high 
technology which are at the core of an information society;
• ability to adopt internationally accepted norms and standards;
• widening of the industrial base and the diffusion of small and medium 
enterprises;
• progress in privatisation and the introduction of an adequate legal 
framework with regard to property rights, contracts, competition and 
company law;
• the evolution of the banking and financial sectors;
• demonopolisation and/or the development of a suitable regulatory 
framework for sectors dominated by former state-owned enterprises, such as 
energy and telecommunications;
• the introduction of measures to encourage research and development;
• developments in wages and productivity;
• measures to promote investment, and, in particular, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and
• exchange rate developments.40
Apart from the Commission's Opinion, other studies of these issues in the 
context of the Czech Republic include those carried out by the OECD (1996), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1996, 1997) and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (1996). The following conclusions emerge;
• The shortcomings of the privatisation process and the role of the banks and 
IPFs (described above) may have slowed down the restructuring process. 
Banks are reluctant to force companies controlled by their funds into 
bankruptcy, while investment funds hesitate to sell companies for fear of 
losing contracts and loans for their bank. This might help to explain the 
relatively low level of bankruptcies and an unemployment rate of only 3.5% 
in 1996, and 5% in 1997,41
40 This issue is discussed in more detail in Section V below.
41 In a transition economy a low unemployment rate may either reflect slow progress in 




























































































• Like the other CEECs. the Czech Republic faces the task of reducing the 
share of GDP represented by sensitive sectors. The sensitive sectors are 
generally defined as: agriculture, textiles, clothing, coal, footwear, steel and 
chemicals.42 43 These are the sectors which tend to be characterised by 
overproduction at a world level, and the present EU members are committed 
to concerted efforts at reduction of capacity in sectors such as steel and 
agriculture.
As can be seen from Table 3, raw material processing, including metallurgy, 
continues to play an important role in the Czech economy.4? The Czech 
Republic has the advantage vis-à-vis the other CEECs of a relatively small 
and declining role of the agricultural sector, accounting for only 5% of GDP 
in 1997.
Czech production of textiles, clothing and leather has declined since 1989. 
Privatisation of these sectors has proceeded rapidly, and foreign direct 
investment has played an important role in modernising production methods. 
To date relatively low labour costs and widespread use of OPT (outward 
processing trade) have enabled the Czech Republic to maintain exports to 
the EU (see Section IVb below).
• FDI is playing a crucial role in increasing productivity in certain sectors 
such as information technology, telecommunications, the machinery and 
equipment industries and the automobile industry.44 Tables 4 and 5, and 
Figure 1 of the Appendix provide data on FDI in the Czech Republic. A 
significant share of this FDI has been concentrated in a small number of
47 The inclusion of chemicals among the sensitive sectors is justified by the large share of EU 
anti-dumping measures in this sector, but it is not accepted by all authors. For instance in 
CEPR (1992) chemicals are not included in the list of sensitive sectors.
43 The steel industry provides an interesting example of difficulties which may be 
encountered in the restructuring process. According to the OECD (1996), after rapid increases 
in output and exports in 1994, Czech production of crude steel grew by only 1.4% in 1995, 
while exports fell by 15% and imports grew by 69% in the same year. Two of the major 
Czech steel companies which were still state owned were working at only 50% of capacity in 
1995. The reduced domestic production reflected disagreements over how to reduce capacity 
in the Ostrava Region and restructure before privatisation, as well as disputes with potential 
foreign investors over the future role of the state in the Czech steel industry. Subsequently a 
modernisation programme was agreed with backing from the International Financial 
Corporation of the World Bank for Nova Hut, the largest Czech producer, while an agreement 
on rationalisation of capacity was reached for the Vitkovice steelmaker (Financial Times, 1 
December 1997).
44 FDI can play a crucial role in assisting structural adjustment as it generally involves a 
transfer of technology, management techniques and of marketing skills. Other firms in the 




























































































very large investments. Two notable early cases were the investment of VW 
in Skoda Auto,4S and Philip Morris in the tobacco industry. At the same 
time, according to the OECD,46 there was foreign participation in as many as 
13,000 enterprises in the Czech Republic.
• In some sectors, relatively cheap labour has enabled exports to continue 
despite low productivity. However, wage increases exceeded productivity 
improvements in the early 1990s,47 though there was a reversal of this trend 
in 1997.48 In 1997 Czech wages were second only to those of Slovenia 
among the CEECs.
Incomes policy was introduced as an integral part of the IMF-agreed 
stabilisation programmes in the CEECs, but has proved extremely 
controversial.49 For instance, after being modified in previous years, tax- 
based wage regulations in the Czech Republic were finally abolished in 
1995. The system had involved enterprises being penalised if wages rose 
more than 5%; but, according to the OECD (1996), this threshold became a 
target even for firms which could not afford such increases.
a Until May 1997, nominal currency stability combined with higher inflation 
than in other OECD countries led to a loss of competitiveness of Czech 
exports due to real appreciation of the koruna.
• The Czech transport infrastructure is better than that of other CEECs, but 
increased capacity for road and air traffic remains necessary. Expansion and 
modernisation of the telecommunications networks is underway, but will 
take some time to complete.
45 Following the take-over of Skoda Auto by VW, in 1995 car production reached 200,000 
units, almost half o f which were exported to the EU (EC Commission, (1997b, p. 67).
46 OECD (1996), p. 76.
47 Pan of the difficulty arises from the relatively low jobless rate (5.5% at the end of March 
1998), particularly in Prague, where the unemployment rate was 1.19% in March 1998 
(Economist Intelligence Unit).
48 In 1997 productivity grew by 6.2% and real wages by 5% (Economist Intelligence Unit).
49 The model for IMF-agreed stabilisation programmes in the transition economies was the 
Polish Balcerowicz Plan which came into effect from 1 January 1990. Subsequently other 
transition countries (including Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania at the beginning of 
1991) introduced similar stabilisation programmes. The main elements of these programmes 
were: rapid and almost complete price liberalisation; restrictive monetary and credit policies; 
tight fiscal discipline, and the wide scale elimination of price subsidies; substantial trade 





























































































• Further measures to improve the environment are urgently required, but 
these could increase production costs.
B. The degree of trade integration achieved before enlargement
As a result of the provisions of the Europe Agreements, a free trade area in 
manufactured products (and to some extent services) will be in place before 
enlargement, though the treatment of agricultural products has been less 
favourable.50 The Europe Agreements permit the continued use of "contingent 
protection", or anti-dumping and safeguard measures in EU-CEEC trade, and 
this has been the source of great contention with the CEECs. The EU has made 
it clear that it will not consider eliminating its commercial policy instruments 
until the CEECs have applied the acquis communautaire governing competition 
policy and state aids fairly comprehensively.
The creation of a customs union with acceptance of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) and full integration into the Single Market will have 
to wait until accession. A major difference between a free trade area and a 
customs union is that the former requires rules of origin. These may be complex 
to administer, and the regulatory uncertainty to which they give rise means that 
market access is conditional.
Accession to the EU therefore implies improved treatment with regard to 
rules of origin, contingent protection, and access to EU markets for agricultural 
products (though, as discussed below, the details of how the CAP is to be 
extended to new CEEC members has yet to be worked out).
Tables 6-9 of the Appendix present data on Czech trade. As can be seen 
from the tables, after 1995 there was a deterioration of the Czech trade and 
current account deficits. This was largely due to real appreciation of the koruna, 
an economic slowdown in the main Czech export markets, and higher imports 
as a result of strong household demand driven by wage increases. In 1997 there 
was some improvement, and the annual trade deficit of $4.7 billion was 
substantially less than forecast.51 This improvement was due to the recovery of 
west European economies, which increased Czech exports, and to the 
depreciation of the currency (by 12% in May 1997 when a floating exchange 
rate was introduced).
5b In most cases the Agreements fixed a quota, rising in time, of EU imports of various 
agricultural products from the CEECs on which import levies and tariffs are gradually 
reduced. In general the concessions entailed a 10% increase in quota each year for the first 5 
years, with a levy or tariff reduction of -20%, -40% and -60% in the first three years, 
subsequently frozen.




























































































From Table 7, which disaggregates trade according to major category, we 
see that machinery and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured 
articles appear to have been performing best, and this trend appears to have 
been confirmed in 1997.5- It also appears that the Czech Republic is succeeding 
in shifting to higher value added exports in these sectors.* 53
Though a more disaggregate and detailed analysis would be necessary, it 
appears that many of the firms and sectors with a positive export experience 
have either managed to attract FDI (automobiles, televisions and certain other 
telecommunications products etc.) or produced in accord with special 
arrangements (such as outward processing in the case of textiles and clothing).54 
According to a survey carried out by Czechinvest in November 1997, foreign 
groups accounted for about 40-50% of Czech exports of manufactured goods.S5
A further important development in Czech trade with the EU is the rising 
share of intra-industry trade, which rose from 61% in 1994 to 65% in 1995.56 
This is generally explained in terms of imperfect competition and economies of 
scale. As economies become more advanced they tend to become more similar 
in terms of technology and resources. As a result, intra-industry trade arising 
from economies of scale in the production of differentiated products tends to 
become more important relative to inter-industry trade based on comparative 
advantage.
5- European Economy, Supplement C, April 1998.
53 Financial Times, 1 December 1997.
54ln 1996, on the basis of Eurostat data, the CEEC(10) accounted for 47.8% of the EU’s 
outward processing trade with third countries for a value of 6.1 billion ECU. The Czech 
Republic accounted for 16.6% of EU outward processing trade with the CEEC (TO) and was 
in third position after Poland (30%) and Hungary (18 %), being closely followed by Romania 
(16.5%).
55 Financial Times, 1 December 1997.
56 Intra-industry trade can be defined as the simultaneous export and import of products 
which, are close substitutes for each other, or. in other words, two-way exchange of goods 
within standard international trade classifications. The estimates are taken from Eurostat 
Statistics in Focus. External Trade 1996, Nos. 7. and 13. The difficulties with this concept are 
discussed in Section Vb below. The estimates in the text are based on the Grubel Lloyd intra­
industry index:
(Xi+Mi) -IXi-Mil x 100 
(Xi+Mi)
The index is calculated using the SITC divisions 00 to 99. Its value varies between 0 (the two 
countries are specialised in different product categories indicating inter-industry trade) and 





























































































V. Taking on the obligations of membership 
A. Progress in adopting the acquis communautaire
Though a detailed analysis of the ability of the Czech Republic to adopt the 
acquis is beyond the present scope, a brief discussion of the issue is necessary 
in view of the growing importance it is assuming as accession negotiations 
proceed.57
In Agenda 2000 the Commission outlined a three-stage framework for the 
adoption of the acquis on the part of the applicant countries:58
• implementation of the Europe Agreement, in particular with regard to trade, 
national establishment, intellectual property and public procurement;
• progress in transposition and effective implementation of the measures set 
out in the 1995 White Paper and, in particular, those relating to key aspects 
of the Single Market such as banking, public procurement and taxation, and
• ability to take on other aspects of the acquis. Areas singled out for attention 
include the environment, agriculture, energy, industry, telecommunications, 
transport, social affairs, customs administration and Justice and Home 
Affairs.
The Commission has also referred to the need to go "beyond the acquis" in 
certain areas such as nuclear safety and criminal justice.
Ability to implement the acquis requires modernisation of the administrations 
of the applicant countries as well as "properly trained and remunerated 
administrators” (Agenda 2000, p. 46). It is also necessary to ensure that regional 
and local government will be able to put EU measures (such as the Structural 
Funds) into effective operation.
The judicial system must be reformed to ensure enforcement of law, 
which will entail retraining (or replacing) certain judges. The courts must be in 
a position to apply EU law upon accession, and should accept its underlying 
principles, such as the primacy of EU law over national legislation. The 
difficulty of this task should not be underestimated, since, as Hoskova (1998)
57 For more complete treatment of the ability of the Czech Republic to take on the acquis see 
EC Commission (1997b).




























































































describes, some of the CEEC constitutions contain terms such as the 
"sovereignty of the people" or "sovereignty of (national) law" which appear to 
run counter to the aim of transferring part of the state’s sovereignty to a supra­
national organisation.59
According to Agenda 2000 (p. 46), the Czech Republic has run into 
difficulties in implementing the Europe Agreement. Particular difficulties have 
included the introduction of an import deposit scheme, which had to be 
suspended in August 1997 after heavy criticism from both the EU and World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).60
With regard to the White Book, the Czech Republic was said to be 
"making satisfactory progress", and Table 10 in the Appendix indicates the 
situation with regard to transposition of White Book measures in 1997.
In its inimitable language, Agenda 2000 (p. 46) maintained that "efforts 
needed to be continued" if the Czech Republic is to adopt the main part of the 
acquis in the medium term. Agriculture, energy and the environment were 
singled out as demanding "particular efforts".
In Agenda 2000, the Commission ruled out the possibility of partial adoption 
of the acquis, and thus in principle removed it from the agenda of negotiators. 
The simple adoption of the entirety of the acquis seems to have become the 
primary condition for accession. However, this position would seem 
questionable on a number of counts:
• Present EU members and the CEECs are treated differently. Previous 
enlargements have been accompanied by modifications to the acquis, and on 
frequent occasions present member states have challenged parts of the
acquis.
59 This is also true of some of the constitutions of present EU member states. Also on this 
point there seems an asymmetry between the obligations the EU expects the applicant 
countries to take on with regards to the acquis, and what is tolerated from existing member 
states.
60 As described in European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1997b), the Czech 
Republic has adopted a policy of relatively rapid trade liberalisation, and in 1997 the average 
level of tariffs on imports was reduced from 3.8% to 3.2%, in line with commitments in the 
Europe Agreement and to the WTO. The Czech import deposit system was introduced in 
April 1997. The system covered about 30% of Czech imports, and required importers to make 
a deposit of 20-60% of the value of imports. The deposit was returned after 180 days, but 





























































































• Taking on EU legislation wholesale may not always be in the best interests 
of transition. As Grabbe (1998, p. 5) argues, development goals and 
accession requirements may not always be synonymous. As EU 
requirements for membership have become more detailed, and aid has been» 
focused on accession requirements, the EU’s emphasis seems to have been 
increasingly on ensuring conformity to its norms.
• In some areas there are difficulties in establishing the actual content of the 
acquis. For example, Justice and Home Affairs poses difficulties as most of 
the provisions adopted under this pillar are not legally binding. Further 
uncertainties arise from the Amsterdam Treaty’s commitment to bring the 
Schengen Agreement under the auspices of the EU. The acquis is constantly 
evolving and presents a moving and not always clear target for the CEECs.
• The insistence that the CEECs take on all of the acquis diverts attention 
from the need to establish a hierarchy in the tasks to be performed. In 
particular, more care should have been taken in dividing the tasks between 
the pre- and post-accession periods.61
B. Adherence to the aim of Economic and Monetary Union
1. The Maastricht criteria
As the Commission's Opinion points out, it is premature to judge whether the 
Czech Republic will be able to participate fully in the third stage of EMU at the 
time of its accession.62 63This will depend on whether structural transformation 
has progressed far enough to enable the Czech Republic to meet the Maastricht 
convergence criteria on a sustained basis.62’
6* For example, legal approximation of social policy is aimed at ensuring the operation of a 
"level playing field” and avoiding the risk of social dumping. However, Smith, A. et al. (1996, 
pp. 5-6) argue that social and environmental policy areas should probably not be harmonised 
prior to accession. Doing so would require the CEECs to accept tighter obligations than 
existing member states. For example, in 1989 the UK opted out of the Social Charter, and 
many derogations have also been granted for expensive environmental regulations.
62 EC Commission (1997b. p. 113).
63 The Maastricht Treaty spelt out five criteria:
i) Successful candidates must have inflation rates no more than 1.5% above the average 
of the three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the Community.
ii) Long-term interest rates should be no more that 2% above the average of that of the 
three lowest inflation countries. This is to ensure that inflation convergence is lasting, because 
otherwise higher expected future inflation in a country would be reflected in higher long-term 
interest rates.
iii) The exchange rate of the country should remain within the "normal" band of the 




























































































Difficulties arise in assessing whether the CEECs meet these criteria. The 
specific characteristics of transition economies means that appropriate data is 
not always available. For instance, the Maastricht criteria refer to public debt, 
but the legacy from the past means that in general official statistics in the 
CEECs are for foreign debt. The underdeveloped long-term capital markets in 
many of the CEECs means that data on long-term bonds is generally not 
available for these countries. Statistics illustrating the Czech experience are set 
out in Table 11.
However, there are also more fundamental difficulties in applying the 
Maastricht criteria to the transition economies, due in particular to the problem 
of "inertial" inflation (Andreff, 1997), and the implications of excessive fiscal 
discipline in these countries.
Inertial inflation can be defined as that arising factors related to 
economic transformation. Economic transformation may contribute to 
inflationary pressures in a number of ways: through price liberalisation, the 
dissolution of the CMEA trading system (and the consequent increase in energy 
prices), devaluation and increased public spending on infrastructure and 
unemployment benefits, wage indexation, and, in some countries, servicing of 
the public debt. As a result there may be increased inflationary expectations, 
which could prove self-fulfilling.
Although external discipline and "borrowed” credibility"'14 can play a 
useful role in CEECs (such as Bulgaria) where fiscal deficits are too high, as 
Tanzi (1993) explains there are various ways in which excessive concern for 
budgetary discipline might hinder transition. For example, if state enterprises 
lay off workers, government spending on unemployment benefits is likely to 
rise. To avoid this increase in spending, governments might encourage firms to 64
years. At the time of the Maastricht Treaty the "normal" band referred to the margins of +/- 
2.25%, but since August 1993, in some circles it is now taken to refer to +/-15%.
iv) The public debt of the country must be less than 60% of GDP.
v) The national budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP.
The last two are referred to as the "fiscal" criteria and are subject to an escape clause. A 
country may be granted a waiver if the gap between the actual and reference situation is 
"exceptional and temporary" or if the excess in public deficit or debt is declining 
"continuously and substantially". How seriously these criteria are being taken by candidates is 
evident from the case of Poland, where the constitution of 1997 introduced rules fixing the 
maximum levels of public deficit and debt at the Maastricht levels.
64 If governments exploit the temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment and 
raise inflation to reduce unemployment, agents will come to expect them to do so and will 
predict a higher level of inflation. What is needed is a way of making commitment to lower 
inflation credible, arid an independent European Central Bank committed to price stability 
may perform this function and bring about a lower rate o f inflation. In this way the inflation- 




























































































continue hoarding workers, which could render restructuring and privatisation 
more difficult. If a country devalues its exchange rate, its interest payments on 
foreign debt measured in domestic currency will rise, adding to government 
expenditure. If the foreign debt is large, a rigid limit on the budget deficit might 
cause the government to delay exchange rate adjustment.
Also on the revenue side is the possible trade-off "between fiscal 
discipline and progress in transition. Transition entails reform of the fiscal 
system by replacing turnover taxes with taxes on income and value added, and 
by widening the tax base. The growth of a new, greenfield private sector 
(sometimes referred to as "organic" privatisation) was accompanied by 
widespread tax evasion. Attempts to crack down on tax evasion could force 
many of these small new firms from the market.
The creation of adequate social safety nets is a central element of the 
transformation process and this could lead to a substantial increase in 
government deficits. Failure to introduce appropriate measures could lead to 
hardship in the more vulnerable sections of society such as large families and 
pensioners.
2. Joining EMU
Even as non-participating countries, the CEECs would be obliged during Stage 
Three of EMU to follow rules relating to fiscal discipline, liberalisation of 
capital movements, and the coordination of economic policy.65 Their central 
banks would participate in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and 
they would be obliged to ensure the independence of their central banks and 
accept the primary objective of price stability. Non-participating countries 
would, however, be allowed to conduct their own monetary policy, and would 
not be subject to the guidelines of the European Central Bank (ECB). Member 
States with derogations would have to participate in some form of exchange 
rate arrangement with participating countries, but they would not have to 
completely fix their exchange rate to the euro.66
Even if they do not participate fully in Stage Three, the CEECs would 
thus have to accept demanding obligations with regard to price stability and 
exchange rate stability. The lessons learnt in implementing the IMF-agreed 
macroeconomic stabilisation programmes in the CEECs could prove useful in 
this context. Although the IMF generally expressed a preference for fixed
65 See Daviddi and Ilzkovitz (1996) for a discussion of this issue.
66 The most likely institutional framework would be a new European Monetary System (EMS 
II). Whatever form this takes, countries not fully participating in EMU are unlikely to be 




























































































nominal exchange rates, the regime actually chosen varied from country to 
country67
The Czech case proves a good example of the difficulty of attempting to 
peg the nominal exchange rate in a transition economy.68 Initially (as was also 
the case in Poland) the magnitude of the devaluation prevented the exchange 
rate from acting as an effective anchor. Subsequently, nominal currency 
stability and a higher rate of inflation than in OECD countries undermined the 
cushion which an undervalued exchange rate provided in the early years of 
transition. The real appreciation of the exchange rate was not matched by 
increases in productivity, and Czech firms began to lose competitiveness. 
Strong speculative pressure emerged and the Czech Central Bank attempted to 
fight the speculative attacks using foreign exchange intervention and an 
increase of interest rates.69 However, in May 1997 it was forced to switch to a 
managed float based on a target rate of 17-19.5 koruna per D-Mark.
In 1994 and 1995 the combination of a fixed exchange rate and the high 
interest rates implied by tight monetary policy also led to massive capital 
inflows into the Czech Republic. Poland and Hungary also experienced capital 
inflows, which increased the demand for domestic currency and rendered 
money supply targets harder to meet. As a result, for a time all three countries 
experienced pressure for currency appreciation despite rising current account 
deficits.
As Gabrisch (1997, pp. 577-580) explains, there are two reasons why the 
CEECs could encounter additional problems in trying to maintain fixed nominal 
exchange rates after accession. Firstly, the difficulties experienced by certain 
CEECs as a result of capital inflows could be repeated after enlargement as a 
consequence of transfers to these countries from the CAP and Structural Funds. 
Secondly, on the basis of OECD calculations there are considerable price 
disparities between the EU and the CEECs.70 As might be expected, the greatest
67 Initially Romania and Bulgaria decided to float because they lacked foreign exchange 
reserves, though on a number of occasions their central banks had to intervene. Bulgaria 
subsequently switched to a currency board, as did Estonia and Lithuania. Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia and (from May 1997) the Czech Republic opted for managed floating.
68 A currency basket peg was first introduced in 1991. The composition of the basket was 
changed in 1992, and again in 1993 when the koruna's exchange rate was based on a basket 
made up of the dollar (35%) and D-mark (65%). Full convertibility o f the koruna was 
implemented from 1 October 1995. The fluctuation band of +/- 0.5% was increased to +/- 
7.5% in February 1996.
69 It is estimated that some $2 billion in reserves was spent in an attempt to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate system, (Financial Times, 1 Decemberl997).
70 Macroeconomic price disparities are generally calculated with the help of purchasing 
power parities (PPPs). PPPs measure the cost of a comparable basket of goods and services in 
national currencies using the exchange rate. The comparative price level index is given by the 




























































































differences are generally in non-tradables, but among tradables, sectors such as 
agriculture and clothing with relatively high levels of protection are also the 
sectors with the largest price disparities.71 With ongoing trade integration and 
the introduction of fixed nominal exchange rates in the CEECs after the 
enlargement, price adjustment to the higher EU levels could be reflected in real 
appreciation of CEEC currencies.
One of the arguments used in favour of EMU is that with high levels of 
integration the exchange rate instrument becomes less effective as an absorber 
of asymmetric shocks, i.e. disturbances which affect the countries involved in 
different ways. The exchange rate instrument operates by changing the relative 
price of output between two countries.72 However, in the case of devaluation the 
domestic price of imported goods will rise. A higher level of integration 
between two countries (or groups of countries) implies a larger share of 
imported goods, so devaluation is likely to have a greater impact on the 
consumer price index in the importing country. The higher prices reduce real 
wages, and may lead to requests for increased nominal wages in the importing 
country. If these are granted, part of the effect of the devaluation is likely to be 
offset, with prices rising and output in the importing country failing to return to 
the level it had prior to the asymmetric shock. There is even a risk that repeated 
devaluations may lead to a wage-price-devaluation spiral.
As Tables 8 and 9 show, since 1989 the level of CEEC trade with the EU 
has been rising rapidly. Pressure for increases in nominal wages has also been 
growing in all these countries, and so it seems likely that wage-price reactions 
may reduce the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate instrument in these 
countries. However, this should not be taken to imply that the exchange rate 
loses all of its usefulness in the CEECs. In practice wage and price reactions are 
unlikely to be immediate, and, as Artis (1994, p. 353) argues, at the very least 
devaluation can give governments a breathing space to introduce other policies.
PPP. According to Gabnsch (1997, pp. 579-580), with Germany as 100, the comparative price 
level indices at 1993 GDP were as follows: Hungary 50, Poland 38, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic 28, Bulgaria and Romania 25, Estonia 23, Latvia 22 and Lithuania 16.
7* Taking Austria as 100, according to Gabrisch (1997, p. 580) the overall comparative price 
index for Poland in 1993 was 39.9. but, for example, the index was 44.3 for food, 47.1 for 
clothing, 19.2 for rent and energy. 49.7 for furniture and household effects, 22.8 for medical 
treatment. 55.5 for transport and telecommunications, 27.7 for recreation and education and 
51.5 for other goods and services.
72 For instance, assuming that France is relatively intensive in the production of wine, and 
Germany is relatively intensive in the production of beer, an asymmetric shock could take the 
form of a health scare which leads consumers to start drinking more beer in place of wine. To 
meet this situation, assuming a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, the French franc 





























































































A further question which arises is whether a higher level ol‘ trade 
integration between the EU and CEECs will make asymmetric shocks more or 
less likely. A higher level of integration will probably lead to some 
convergence of consumer tastes and preferences. If this is the case, on the 
demand side the shocks would be more likely to affect all the partners, reducing 
the role for a shock-absorber such as the adjustment of exchange rates among 
the member states.
The implications for the production side are less clear. If integration 
leads to specialisation according to a Ricardian concept of comparative 
advantage, the economies of the EU member states will become less similar and 
thus more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. At the same time, the growing 
share of intra-industry trade between the EU states and the CEECs could signify 
that the economic structures of the member states of an enlarged EU are 
converging and thus ever less likely to be affected by asymmetric shocks.
However, even here the issue is far from being clear-cut, since what 
appears as intra-industry trade may in fact disguise huge differences in quality. 
The concept of intra-industry trade has been challenged as being merely a 
statistical phenomenon since, in general, the measured level of intra-industry 
trade decreases as the level of disaggregation of data increases. What is needed 
in this context is further research into the distinction between vertical intra­
industry trade (involving quality differences) and horizontal intra-industry trade 
(which is trade in genuinely similar products).
The cost of foregoing the exchange rate instrument will also be less if it 
could be replaced by alternative mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include 
wage-price flexibility and factor mobility, as well as EU or national measures 
such as regional or budgetary policy, which could be used to compensate 
regions or countries which have been adversely affected.
Wage-price flexibility implies that in the case of a permanent adverse 
asymmetric shock the real wages and relative prices in the affected country or 
region (if the production is concentrated in a particular area) will fall. There 
will be a strong incentive for workers to move to regions or countries where 
real wages are higher. Similarly, if there is sufficient capital mobility, capital 
will be attracted to regions where the remuneration of investment is higher. If 
factors of production were sufficiently mobile, this process would continue 
until differences in the remuneration of factors between regions were 
eliminated.
Much progress has been made in increasing factor mobility in the 




























































































considerable degree of mobility of capital has been achieved, this is far from 
being the case for labour. Labour mobility is also one of the most sensitive 
aspects of enlargement, given the widespread fear in existing EU member states 
that it could lead to large-scale westward migration and downward pressure on 
wages and higher levels of unemployment in the EU (15).73 For this reason, 
there has been much debate about whether to introduce a transition period 
before allowing full labour mobility after the eastward enlargement, even 
though this runs counter to one of the fundamental tenets of the Internal Market 
Programme.74
In the case of a single country, if the demand for a good whose 
production is concentrated in a particular region falls, transfers from the 
government budget can compensate regional producers for the loss of income. 
At least in theory, EU regional or budgetary policies could be used in an 
analogous way to offset the repercussions of asymmetric shocks between the 
member states. However, both the size of the EU Budget (with a ceiling of 
1.27% of EU GDP) and the limit of 4% of GDP on transfers through the 
Structural Funds (see Section VIb) severely restrict the ability of the EU to 
carry out this kind of stabilising role between member states in an enlarged EU.
73 Much of the recent literature suggests that migration in an enlarged EU will be on a 
manageable scale. This conclusion emerges either from a comparison with labour flows from 
South to North Europe over the 1950-70 period (CEPR, 1992) or from an analysis of the 
factors underlying the decision to migrate (Faini. 1995, and Faini and Venturini, 1994). 
Individuals have a preference for living in their own country for social, cultural and linguistic 
reasons, so an individual will only undertake migration when the wage differential is large 
enough to offset the non-monetarv costs of migration.




























































































VI. The condition that the EU must be able to absorb new members and 
maintain the momentum of integration.
A. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
In order to ensure that enlargement does not slow the integration process. 
Agenda 2000 called for radical reform of the CAP. In March 1998, the 
Commission presented a modified version of the proposals, which entailed 
continuing in the direction of the 1992 MacSharry Reform.75 The March 
proposals called for cuts in intervention prices for cereals by 20%. dairy 
products by 15% and beef by 30%, with farmers in the EU (15) being 
compensated for these price cuts through direct payments.76
An alternative proposal (Buckwell et al, 1997) recommends less reliance 
on compensatory payments (which should be temporary as they are, after all, 
meant to compensate for a one-off price cut) and increased use of payments to 
farmers for their role in rural development and environmental protection.
According to the estimates presented in Agenda 2000, the costs to the EU 
budget of extending the reformed CAP to the 10 CEECs would amount to 17.8 
billion ECU over the 2000-2006 period.77 However, Agenda 2000 leaves a 
number of questions open with regard to agricultural policy.78
• When, whether, and what form of CAP reform will be introduced? In the 
past the EU farm lobby has proved itself extremely resistant to CAP reform. 
On this occasion as well it seems likely that EU farmers will organise
Central elements of this reform were a 29% reduction in the target price for cereals and the 
introduction of direct payments to compensate farmers for their loss of income. In the case of 
large farmers the compensatory payment was conditional on the set-aside (i.e. leaving idle) a 
percentage of their land (initially 15%). The reform package also included measures for other 
product groups, such as a 15% reduction in intervention prices for beef, and the use of 
premiums per head of cattle to compensate farmers and to encourage less intensive means of 
beef production.
26 It was also proposed to continue milk quotas until 2006 and to set compulsory set-aside of 
land at zero.
77 This would consist of 0.5 billion ECU (rising to 0.6 billion ECU from 2002) in pre­
accession aid, while new member states would receive a total of 6.2 billion ECU for market 
organisation measures (in particular for the dairy sector) and 7.6 billion ECU for rural 
development accompanying measures over the 2002-2006 period (Agenda 2000, p. 73).
78 Estimates of the cost of extending an unreformed CAP to the CEECs (which are generally 
presented on an annual basis) are far higher. For instance, according to Baldwin (1994), extra 
CAP spending as a result of the accession of the Visegrad Four, Bulgaria and Romania would 
be in the order of 23.2 billion ECU1 per year. For a survey of these estimates see Senior Nello 




























































































vigorous opposition to cuts in guaranteed support prices, even if these are 
accompanied by compensatory payments.79
• Will agriculture be subject to a transition period after enlargement, given the 
fears of EU farmers that they will not be able to cope with increased 
competition? Proposals to introduce a transition period are generally aimed 
at allowing CEECs more time to adjust to the higher levels of agricultural 
prices and the more stringent veterinary requirements and standards in the 
EU. In 1997 farm-gate prices in the CEECs were only in the order of 40- 
80% of EU levels, though the gap is narrowing.80 However, it is difficult to 
see how transitional measures could operate without border controls 
between the EU(15) and the CEECs, which would (at least in principle) run 
counter to the Single Market.
• Why did Agenda 2000 place so little emphasis on measures to improve farm 
structures, thereby missing an occasion to correct the long-standing 
imbalance between market and structural policies in the EU?
• Why are the proposals in Agenda 2000 relatively detailed for certain 
products (cereals, dairy products etc.), but suggest little more than general 
aims for others (such as the Mediterranean products)?
• Will an enlarged EU manage to maintain its Uruguay Round commitments, 
in particular those regarding limitations on subsidised exports? 81 In the 
Uruguay Round, the CEECs were bound to zero, or very low, levels of 
export subsidies. A large share of CEEC agricultural exports are directed to 
the former Soviet Republics, but in the absence of export subsidies an 
increase in CEEC agricultural prices to EU levels is likely to undermine this 
export market.
79 it is generally agreed that no reform will be attempted before the German elections of 
September 1998, and even subsequently the importance of the German farm vote for the 
CSU/CDU, in particular in Bavaria, could prove a major obstacle to change. Two of the main 
agricultural exporters in the EU, France and the Netherlands, may have an interest in reform 
as a necessary condition for reaching agreement in the next WTO negotiations, where 
pressure for further liberalisation of international agricultural trade is expected. For an 
analysis of the role of the farm lobby see inter alia Senior Nello (1984, 1997).
80 For a discussion of the differences in farm prices between the CEECs and EU, and of the 
prospects of convergence, see Buckwell et al (1994) and Agenda 2000 (p. 50).
81 According to this agreement, the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) for agriculture had 
to be reduced by 20% compared with a base period of 1986-88, all non-tariff barriers on 
agricultural imports had to be converted into tariffs and reduced by 36% in the case of 
industrialised countries, while export subsidies had to be reduced by 36% in value and 21% in 




























































































• Will direct income payments be extended to farmers in CEECs joining the 
EU? At least initially, the payments were introduced as compensation for the 
loss of income resulting from the reductions in price support implied by the 
MacSharry reform. As the Commission’s Agricultural Strategy Paper and 
Agenda 2000 argue, farmers in CEECs will not experience price cuts, and 
the application of these payments only to farmers could increase income 
disparities (inter alia favouring those who have already benefited from 
restitution programmes) and create social unrest. Moreover, extension of 
these payments to the CEECs would seem to run counter to the obligations 
of the GATT Uruguay Round.82 There would therefore seem to be a case for 
concentrating expenditure on rural development and protection of the 
landscape, as Buckwell et al (1997) suggest.
• What will happen if the CAP is renationalised and member states pay a 
growing share of direct subsidies to farmers? Given the severe budget 
constraints in the CEECs this could imply less funds available for 
agriculture than in existing EU members.
To ensure that enlargement does not risk slowing the momentum of integration, 
the applicant countries also have the task of adopting appropriate policies 
during the pre-accession period. During the early years of transition, there was 
much debate about whether the CEECs should introduce CAP-like policies 
such as price support and production quotas in the interest of harmonising their 
agricultural policies with those of the EU. However, both the Commission's 
1995 Agricultural Strategy Paper and Agenda 2000 advised against introducing 
such measures, and there are strong reasons of economic rationality against 
doing so:
• The CAP is undergoing change so the CEECs would be harmonising their 
agricultural policies to an unknown and moving target.
• Because CAP-like policies tend to freeze existing production structures, they 
place too little emphasis on structural adjustment. They are thus particularly 
inappropriate to economies in transition.
• CAP-like measures which rely heavily on price support (with the 
expenditure on export subsidies and/or public stocks of surpluses this 
necessitates) are too costly for most CEECs.
The Czech Republic liberalised prices for agricultural products in 1991, though 
some temporary controls on food prices were maintained. Agricultural policy
82 According to the "Peace Clause" of the Agreement, until 2003 the MacSharry 
compensatory payments were excluded from the requirement to reduce domestic support (i.e. 





























































































instruments similar to those of the CAP were introduced, but the level of 
support was far lower. A system of guaranteed prices or state purchases was 
introduced for major products such as milk, bread, wheat and beef. Export 
subsidies to reduce domestic surpluses were used for milk. Tariffs or import 
levies were applied to certain sensitive products including live cattle, live 
sheep, meat, butter and potatoes.
The low level of support reflected the Czech government’s commitment 
to creating a market-orientated agricultural sector. According to the OECD, the 
percentage producer subsidy equivalent (PSE)88 for the Czech Republic 
declined from 69% in 1986 to 53% in 1990, 25% in 1993 and was as low as 
10% in 1996. During the 1990s the Czech PSE has remained well below that of 
the EU (which declined slowly from 50% in 1986 to 43% in 1996). In 1996 it 
was also below those of Poland (28%), Hungary (11%) and Slovakia (19%).83 4
According to the Commission's Opinion, the main difficulties still facing 
Czech agriculture include low yields, poor quality, the food industry, 
environmental consequences, and inadequate market information. The problems 
of regional disparities, upland farming and the damage from the 1997 floods 
could be added to this list. Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that the 
Czech Republic would be able to apply the CAP to its agricultural sector 
"without significant problems in the medium term".
B. The Structural Funds
The European Council in Edinburgh set the EU's total budget for economic and 
social cohesion at 0.46% of EU GDP for the period 1993-99. In Agenda 2000, 
the Commission proposed maintaining that percentage, spending 275,000 
million ECU (at 1997 prices) on the Structural and Cohesion Funds for the 
years 2000-2006, as compared with 200,000 million ECU over the 1994-99 
period. 45,000 million would be earmarked for enlargement. This would consist 
of 1 billion each year for the CEECs over the 2000-2006 period as part of the 
pre-accession strategy, and 38 billion from the Structural and Cohesion funds 
for the new member states. As a result, by 2006 the Structural Funds for 
enlargement would account for about 30% of all transfers through the Structural 
Funds.85
83 The PSE is the measure generally accepted in making international comparisons of the 
level of agricultural support. It is defined as the subsidy that would be necessary to replace all 
the agricultural policies used in a country and leave farm revenue unchanged.
84 Agra Europe East Europe, November 1997.




























































































The estimated transfers resulting from an extension of the Structural 
Funds to the CEECs on present criteria would represent an extremely high 
percentage of the GDP of these countries.86 Agenda 2000 therefore proposed 
placing a ceiling of 4% of the GDP of the recipient country on the size of 
transfers under the Structural Funds.
Extension of the Structural Funds to the CEECs also requires changes in 
the way in which the Funds operate.87 Agenda 2000 proposed reducing the 
number of Objectives to three. Objective 1 would apply to regions whose GDP 
is less than 75% of the EU average. Objective 2 would concent regions with 
major economic and social restructuring needs. Objective 3 would be a 
"horizontal" measure designed to develop human capital, and applying in all 
regions not covered by Objectives 1 and 2. Its aim would be to help member 
states adapt and modernise their education, training and employment. In 
Agenda 2000 the Commission refers to a "phasing out mechanism" for regions 
currently eligible for transfers under Objective 1, but which would be above the 
75% threshold in an enlarged EU.
Over the 1993-1999 period, the entire territory of Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece fell under Objective 1, and this is also likely to be the case for the 
CEECs entering the EU. According to Agenda 2000 (p. 138). in 1995 GDP per 
capita in the Czech Republic amounted to 3,490 ECU: second only to Slovenia 
among the CEECs, but still well below the 7,770 ECU of Portugal, which had 
the lowest level of GDP per capita in the EU( 15) in 1995.88 Although there are 
important regional differences within the Czech Republic, with GDP in Prague 
over 50% higher than the national average, the GDP of the Prague area is still 
only 75% of the EU(15).89
86 According to a study carried out by the Commission (1996b), these transfers would 
amount to 15% of GDP for Hungary, 18% for the Czech and Slovak Republics, 25% for 
Poland, and roughly 50% for Romania and Bulgaria.
87 The main aim of the Structural Funds is to assist the less-developed regions of the EU, and 
for this purpose six objectives were identified: (1) the less-well developed areas of the 
Community, which are defined as those whose GDP per capita is less than 75% of the EU 
average; (2) regions affected by the decline of traditional industries: (3) combating long-term 
unemployment (more than 12 months) and (4) helping workers adjust to technological 
change; (5a) assisting the structural adjustment of agriculture: (5b) aid to rural areas; (6) 
regions with a low density of population in the extreme north of Finland and Sweden.
88 These estimates should, however, be treated with caution. According to PlanEcon (vol. 14, 
1998) official statistics underestimated Czech GDP by some 11% in 1996 and 14% in 1997. 
This is because the production of many new, small private enterprises fails to show up in 
official statistics, while many firms understate their output to pay less taxes. This represents 
an inversion of the tendency under the previous system, when firms overstated output levels 
to meet plan targets.




























































































The Commission's proposals seem more geared to the priority of releasing 
funds for the applicant countries than to the need to improve the operating 
efficiency of the Funds themselves. A number questions therefore remain open:
• It is unclear that the present main recipients of the Structural Funds in the 
EU (15) are prepared to accept the reallocation of part of the transfers to the 
CEECs.90
• The predictions concerning growth rates in the EU(15) and CEECs which 
underlie the estimates presented in Agenda 2000 appear optimistic.91
• The ceiling on transfers of 4% of the GDP of the recipient country would 
have the perverse effect that the poorest countries (i.e. those with the lowest 
GDP) would receive the least.92
• On equity grounds, the Agenda 2000 proposals appear questionable. As 
Gianzi (1998, pp. 202-203) illustrates, there are substantial differences in the 
proposed per capita transfers for the EU(15), the CEECs joining the EU, and 
those remaining as "pre-ins. The Agenda 2000 proposals would entail an 
estimated transfer of roughly 235 ECU per capita for the 37.5% of the 
EU(15) population expected to benefit from Objectives 1 and 2 over the 
2000-2006 period.93 Excluding Ireland,94 according to Agenda 2000 
proposals, the three countries currently benefiting from the Cohesion Fund 
would receive 344 ECU per capita over the 2000-2006 period. Assuming 
that the five CEEC front-runners join in 2002, Agenda 2000 envisages that 
they would receive roughly 120 ECU per capita each year for the 2002-2006 
period. This is well below the 1999 allocation of 400 ECU per capita for 
Greece and Portugal, but well above the 5 billion ECU (16.7 ECU per capita
90 This reallocation of structural spending could be avoided by raising the ceiling on 
contributions to the EU Budget, but there is unlikely to be the political willingness, in 
particular, on the part of Germany (the main contributor) to do so.
91 An average growth rate of 2.5% per year is assumed for the EU(15)and 4% for the CEECs.
92 Although if a poorer country is larger as, for example, Poland or Romania, it will get more 
in absolute terms.
93 This estimate is calculated dividing 230,000 million by 37.5% of the EU (15) population 
of 374 million, reflecting the Commission proposal that the percentage of the EU population 
benefiting from regional measures should be reduced from 52% in 1997 to 35-40% over the 
2000-2006 period. However, the estimate fails to take account of the fact that there will also 
be transfers under the new Objective 3 which, as a horizontal measure, is also likely to benefit 
the EU population in other areas. The estimate is also based on the assumption that the share 
of the population benefiting from regional measures remains unchanged over the 2000-2006 
period.





























































































each year) proposed in Agenda 2000 for transfers under the Structural Funds 
to the five CEEC back-markers for the 2000-2006 period.95 96
• The new Objective 2 will cover rural development regions (formerly 
Objective 5b), regions suffering from industrial decline (formerly Objective 
2) and urban centres, and the advantage of grouping regions with such 
different requirements is not immediately obvious.
• The condition of partnership in implementing structural measures also poses 
difficulties for the extension of the Structural Funds to the CEECs.9,1 
Partnership entails cooperation between the Commission and national, 
regional and local authorities in programming structural spending. The 
principle of subsidiarity holds that where possible regional authorities 
should be responsible for the implementation of structural measures. 
However, the legacy of communist centralisation left the Czech Republic 
(like the other CEECs) with little experience of regional devolution of 
authority. The previous system provided only for artificially-created 
planning regions designed to implement the plan on a territorial basis. As a 
result, relying on regional and local authorities to implement structural 
measures could imply extremely high costs of coordination and 
administration. There may even be a case for relying more heavily on 
instruments such as the PHARE Programme or the Cohesion Fund which 
operate at the national level. This would also allow the beneficiary countries 
more flexibility in meeting the dilemma of whether to concentrate assistance 
on regions with the best prospects of catching up ("poles of development"), 
or whether to give priority to channelling aid to the poorest, most backward 
areas.97
• A further principle which could create difficulties for the CEECs is 
additionality, which aims to ensure that EU funds do not simply replace 
national expenditure. Additionality requires that EU measures are 
accompanied by matching funding from the member states of up to 50%. 
Agenda 2000 proposes flexibility in the application of this principle to the 
CEECs.
95 Though, according to the Agenda 2000 proposals, the 5 back-markers would also benefit 
from 7.5 billion ECU through the PHARE Programme, and 2.5 billion ECU for agriculture. 
This would bring the total pre-accession transfers to these 5 countries to 50 ECU per capita 
each year over the 2000-2006 period.
96 See Brenton and Gros (1993) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
97 Some countries are taking steps to meet these shortcomings. For example, in summer 1998 
Poland passed a series of laws creating a new system of 16 regions with substantial 




























































































Also with regard to the Structural Funds, it is difficult to identify "appropriate" 
policies for the CEECs during the pre-accession period. The priority should be 
on growth and the catching-up process (thereby reducing the difficulties of 
extending the Structural Funds to these countries), but it is not always evident 
how this is best achieved.
According to Baldwin (1994), in order to reach a per capita income of 
75% the EU average, the Czech Republic would take 14 years with an annual 
growth rate of 5%, and 24 years with a growth rate of 3%. In 1997 following 
the currency crisis the Czech Republic introduced two austerity budgets. It was 
argued that these were necessary to regain credibility, but the estimated growth 
in Czech GDP for 1997 was only 1%, falling well short of the 4% annual 
growth rate forecast for the CEECs in Agenda 2000, or the estimates presented 
by Baldwin.
Conclusions
What may we say about the Copenhagen economic accession criteria the light 
of the Czech experience? With regard to the requirement that the applicant state 
should have a "functioning market economy", the Czech case demonstrates that 
it is not sufficient simply to establish institutions and an appropriate legal 
framework. What is essential is to ensure that legislation is enforced and that 
market institutions operate effectively. From Agenda 2000 and the Opinions, a 
blueprint of what the Commission would like to see as a "market economy" also 
emerges, though it remains an open question how far the present EU(15) 
member states meet those requirements.
Turning to "capacity to cope with competitive pressures", assessment of 
an applicant country on the basis of this criterion would require a 
comprehensive, sector-by-sector analysis of present economic performance, and 
likely future developments in an enlarged EU. Further research is required in 
this area, but the enormity of the task is such that there may even be a case for 
arguing that competitiveness is a concept which lends itself to analysis at the 
level of the firm or even the sector, but not the country level.
Discussion of the "ability of the applicant country to take on the 
obligations of membership" was limited here to the ability to take on the acquis 
communautaire and the question of adherence to the aim of Economic and 
Monetary Union.
Implementation of the acquis is likely to prove a lengthy and complex 




























































































assumption of Agenda 2000 and of the Commission’s proposals of March 1998. 
that the first wave of Eastward enlargement to five countries could take place in 
2002, would seem excessively optimistic.
Even if the five CEECs negotiating to join the EU do not participate fully 
in the Stage Three of EMU, it seems likely that the rules relating to fiscal 
discipline, capital movements, and exchange rate arrangements will create 
difficulties. The Czech Republic was the only CEEC to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate over a long period, and even it was forced to switch to a managed 
float in May 1997. Huge capital inflows attracted by high interest rates have 
rendered monetary targets difficult to realise. In some measure, such problems 
stem from the specific characteristics of transition economies and, in particular, 
their tendency towards relatively high inflation. Under these conditions, an 
attempt to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate may lead to real appreciation 
of the currency and loss of competitiveness. Moreover, excessive concern for 
budgetary discipline may slow the transition process, and risks bringing 
hardship to the more vulnerable sections of society.
If the timetable for enlargement slips, pressure for reform of the EU's two 
main cost-intensive policies, the Structural Funds and the CAP, will decrease. 
As argued above, the proposed reforms of the Structural Funds set out in 
Agenda 2000 seem more geared to releasing funds for the applicant countries 
than to ensuring the effective functioning of the Funds themselves. A delay in 
enlargement would at least have the advantage of allowing more time to analyse 
how social and cohesion transfers could be better targeted.
Though enlargement is used politically as an argument to reform the 
CAP, there are other strong arguments in favour of change. External pressures 
include the commitments of the GATT Uruguay Round (in particular with 
regard to export subsidies), and the next WTO negotiations (which are likely to 
entail further liberalisation of international agricultural trade). Internal 
pressures for reform emerge from the burden of agriculture on the EU budget, 
and the failure of the CAP to reduce the disparities in income between poorer 
and richer fanners, and between Mediterranean and Continental agriculture. A 
new approach is necessary in which farmers are not only considered as 
producers (often simply adding to surplus stocks of foodstuffs), but are valued 
for the role they can play in rural development and environmental protection. A 
reformed CAP should be aimed at furthering these wider objectives in the 
whole of Europe, not just the EU( 15).
While the onus is on the EU to reform its policies and institutions such 
that enlargement does not slow "the momentum of integration", the CEECs 
must also adopt appropriate policies to prepare for accession. The primary 




























































































introduction of CAP-like measures based heavily on price support and supply 
restraint does not seem suitable for the CEECs. In order to facilitate 
participation in the Structural Funds, it is necessary to tread a fine line between 































































































Table 1: Basic Data on the Czech Republic (1995)
Area pop­
ulation
































as % EU 
(15)
79 10.3 36.1 3490 20 97.2 9410 55 
1078 105.3 234 2220 13 582.0 5530 32
33% 28% 4% 13% 9% 32%




























































































Table 2: Changes in Key Macroeconomic Variables in the Czech Republic
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
(est.)
GDP -14.2 -6.4 -0.9 2.6 6.4 3.9 1.0 1.9
GDP CEEC (13*) -11.0 -4.4 0.5 3.9 5.2 4.0
Inflation 56.5 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.4 9.5
(annual change in 
CPI)
gross fixed capital 
formation % increase




3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 5.2 5.5##
Nominal wages and 
salaries
125.3 118.5 118.5 118.0 113.4
(previous year= 100) 
real wages and 
salaries (previous 
year= 100)
103.7 107.7 108.6 108.5 105
US ($ exchange rates 
(average of period)
28.29 29.15 28.78 26.55 27.14 32.67 32.9#
* CEEC (10) plus Albania. Croati;., anti the FYR (former Yugoslav Republic) of Macedonia 
#July 1 
## March
** ILOdntemational Labour Office) methodology
Source: OECD (1996), Eurostat. EC Commission (1997b), Financial Times, 1 December 
1997, EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) 1998 and CERGE (Centre for Economic Research 



































































































Raw material processing 21 2°
(including metallurgy, cement,
glass, ceramics, paper and wood)





Automobile industry 6 6.5
Information technology 4.5 2
Textiles, clothing and leather 3.5 10




Other sectors 9.5 2.5
Total industry 100 100
Industry (excluding construction) 34%
as % GDP




























































































Table 4: FDI Inflows to the CEECs
millions of dollars










2720 1264 7120 123 692
Hungary 4410 1986 13260 195 1300
Poland 1134 2741 5398 71 140
Slovakia 134 177 623 33 117
Slovenia 170 180 731 90 372
Bulgaria 82 100 425 12 51
Romania 404 210 1186 9 52
Estonia 199 110 735 71 477
Latvia 165 230 644 92 258
Lithuania 72 152 285 41 76
Croatia 81 389 615 73 129
Albania 70 90 298 28 93
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997 Transition Report
Figure 1: Share of CEEC(5) in Cumulative FDI Inflows 1989-1996




























































































Second quarter of 1997
Table 5: FDI in the Czech Republic
Oriein of investment Sector of investment
Germany 27.8% Transport and communications 20.6%
Netherlands 14.8% Consumer goods and tobacco 14.3%
US 14.6% Automobile industry 13.9%
Switzerland 11.3% Trade and services 9.0%
France 7.3% Chemical industry 8.2%
Austria 7.1% Banks and insurance companies 8.2%
Others 17.1% Others 25.8%
Total $2094 million
Source: Financial Times of 1 December 1997, which bases its estimates on Czechinvest
Table 6: The Czech Balance of Payments
million US ($)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Exports of goods (f.o.b) 14016.4 21462.4 21702.5 22530
Imports of goods (f.o.b) -14905.3 -25140.3 -27674.3 27120
Trade balance -8 8 8 .8 -3677.8 -5971.8 -4590
Services net 733.0 1842.0 1785.1 1730
Income net* -2 0 .2 -105.2 -679.9 -630
Current account balance -49.7 -1369.1 -4476.4 -3156
Capital and financial account 
(excluding reserves)
3371.1 8232.6 4072.3 1092
Reserve assets** -2371.6 -7458.1 828.0 1767
* Net income includes direct, portfolio and other investment income and compensation of 
employees
** Change in reserve assets in a year. + signifies an increase and - signifies a decrease.




























































































Table 7: The Structure of Czech Foreign Trade
% total imports or exports
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Imports by SITC
(1+2) food and live animals, 
beverage and tobacco
7.5 7.3 8.2 6.3 6.5
2 Crude materials, inedible 5.8 5 4.9 4.5 3.7
3 mineral fuels and lubricants 15.5 11.1 10 7.8 8.7
4 animal and vegetable products 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
etc.
5 chemicals and related products 9.8 12.1 13.1 11.8 11.8
6 manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material
10.3 15.9 16.5 20.3 19.3
7 machinery and transport 
equipment
41.5 36.1 35 37.1 38.2
8 misc. Manufactured articles 9.3 11.7 11.9 11.9 11.5
9 goods not elsewhere classified 0 0.4
Exports by SITC
(1+2) food and live animals, 
beverage and tobacco
8.8 7.8 6.5 5.6 5.1
2 Crude materials, inedible 6.5 6.1 6.8 5.2 4.7
3 mineral fuels and lubricants 5.7 6.2 5.7 4.3 4.5
4 animal and vegetable products 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
etc.
5 chemicals and related products 9.2 9.5 10 9.3 9.1
6 manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material
32.3 29.9 30.5 32.2 28.8
7 machinery and transport 
equipment
25.4 27.6 25.9 30.4 32.7
8 misc. Manufactured articles
9 goods not elsewhere classified
12 12.7 14.3 12.8 14.9




























































































Table 8: The Increase in the CEEC Share of EU Trade
% %
Increase Increase % total % total % total % total
in EU in EU extra-EU extra-EU extra-EU extra-EU
(12) (12) exports exports impons imports











Hungary 126.4 151.0 0.7 1.6 0.6 1.5
Poland 241.8 187.6 1.0 3.2 0.9 2.1
Bulgaria 25 332.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3
Romania 414.5 28 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.7




























































































Table 9: The Increase in the EU Share of the Total Trade of Selected 
CEECs over the 1989-95 Period
% total % total % total % total
exports exports imports imports
1989 1997 1989 1997
Czech Rep. 18.2% (EC) 60.2% 17.8% (EC) 51.8%
and 4.6% (Cz Rep.) 5.5% (Cz Rep.)
Slovakia (Austria) 47.3% (Austria) 39.5%
6.6% (Slovakia) 7.8% (Slovakia)
(GDR) (GDR)





Poland 31.8% (EC) 65.3%# 34.2% (EC) 63.1%#
0.5 (EFTA) 0.7%
(EFTA)
Bulgaria 5.5% (EC) 37.6% 10.3% (EC) 43.1%
1.5% 3.9%
(EFTA) (EFTA)
Romania* 28.5% (EC) 55.6%# 13.8% (EC) 52.2%#
3.2% 1.3%
(EFTA) (EFTA)
* Earlier data is for 1988
** January-February 1998
# 1996
Unless otherwise stated the statistics are for EC 12 in 1989 and EU 15 in 1995.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), own 
calculations on the basis of PlanEcon and EC Commission, 1994b, (Romania and Bulgaria), 




























































































Table 10: Transposition of the 1995 White Book Measures into National 
Legislation







1. free movement of capital 4 1
2. free movement and safety of 
industrial products
165 60
3. competition 4 3
4. social actions and policies 29 22
5. agriculture 203 57
6. transport 55 27
7. audiovisual 1 1
8. protection of the environment 45 13
9. telecommunications 16 3
10. direct taxation 4 2
11. public procurement 6 5
12. financial services 21 11
13. protection of personal information 2 0
14. company law and accounting 11 7
15. civil code 2 1
16.mutual recognition of 
qualifications
18 2
17. intellectual property 11 7
18. energy 15 2
19. customs union 201 173
20. indirect taxation 75 4
21. consumer protection 11 6




























































































Table 11: The Czech Republic and the Maastricht Criteria






3% GDP surplus of 1.4% 
GDP
surplus of 1.8% 
GDP
0%
public debt % 
GDP





3.1% 20.8% 9% 8.4%




Source: Senior Nello, S.M., and Smith, K.E. (1997), based on IFS (International Financial 
Statistics) and EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) data.
*Given difficulties in finding comparable data on public debt (the Maastricht criterion), 
foreign debt has been used here.
** long term government bond yield (forecast 1997)
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